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Last night’s meeting was probably the most frustrating, for me, so far. I watched a 90 minute discussion that was entirely taken up with debating whether or not another meeting was needed.

The session in question was supposed to be about “impacts of mitigation”. I mentioned this set of talks in an earlier blog where I discussed my joy at hearing border carbon adjustments (BCAs) openly discussed. I’d hoped there was going to be more but, instead, I had an hour and a half of what seemed to be pointless, procedural wrangling over whether or not an expert panel needed to meet again ahead of COP26. The row wasn’t about whether there were things the experts needed to discuss but simply about whether the meeting was legally required.

If it was a purely legal issue then the diplomats could simply ask the UN secretariat for guidance and move on but, instead, both sides dug in as if this matter was the key to the future of the planet. I was so puzzled by this that I discussed it with other observers to see if we could understand what was underneath the surface. One speculation was that it was a tactic to slow negotiations down and was driven by fossil-fuel exporting nations. But, if that was the case, why was this position being supported strongly by the small-island nations? They have more to lose than anyone and the greatest possible incentive to get negotiations moving.

My own speculation was that there’s some kind of agreement between parties that are dependent on fossil-fuel exports and parties that urgently need funding to help fight the impacts of climate change. Perhaps they’ve agreed to support each other in the negotiations. If so, it’s a dangerous game and is easily countered. We (i.e. the rich nations) just need to do what’s right and what we’ve already agreed to do, i.e. to find $100 billion per year to help those nations under greatest threat.

Dave Waltham

No I haven’t missed a day; we actually had Sunday off!

Monday night was my first late session (10:00 pm – 1:00 am) and I’m definitely starting to see a pattern in the negotiations. I had expected all sorts of subtle groupings of nations and shifting alliances depending upon the exact issue. That’s not what I’m seeing. I’m sure I’m missing many minor distinctions in positions but all the meetings I’ve been to, so far, have followed the exact same story-board.

The meetings are introduced by two co-convenors who, after asking if all parties are happy for observers to remain, then invite “interventions”, i.e. statements from nations or groups of nations raising any concerns about the meeting topic. Without fail, the first intervention is a long one from “the G77 and China”  (G77 is the coalition of 134 developing countries). This intervention inevitably includes requests for “balance” and for “all views to be represented”. Nearly all of the subsequent interventions are then from groups such as AOSIS (the alliance of small island states), LMDC (the like-minded developing countries) and AGN (the African group of Negotiators) who start by “aligning themselves with the statement of G77 and China”. Interspersed into these are a small number of short interventions by individual nations such as the US, Australia and Japan which express bland support for the process and request that negotiations concentrate upon the already agreed topics for discussion.

I think I’m seeing a classic division between those who want to split the negotiations up into tractable, bite-sized problems and those who understand that all issues are inter-related and that the horse-trading reality of such negotiations is that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” (where have I heard that recently?). Of course, both points of view are valid but it’s interesting that the parties divide starkly according to “the West versus the rest”.

I don’t think this division is for cynical reasons. Less developed nations do have a point (in my opinion) when they say that the problem was largely caused by richer nations and that only the richer nations have the resources to pay the costs of avoiding dangerous global warming. Given this, it makes sense for them to want to combine all the issues so that they have some leverage but it does feel a bit like the cold war threat of mutual assured destruction. There must be a better way.

Dave Waltham

I’ve spent the last few days, as many of you will have done over half term, with my family. So I’ve missed a few days but am back in harness now.

The highlight for me, on day 6, was the realisation that border carbon adjustments are on the “agenda” but not on the agenda. I guess I need to unpack that Zen-like statement.

I’ve just sat through a Forum on the Impacts of Climate Mitigation Measures. This is meant to look at, both negative and positive, unintended consequences of anything the world does to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A detailed workplan was agreed at COP25 in Madrid (2019) although, because of Covid, progress on the workplan has been slow. This workplan explicitly mentions impacts on trade but does not explicitly mention border tariffs.

As a result, many (mostly developing) nations are requesting that a technical paper be produced that discusses the impact of border carbon adjustments on exports from developing nations whilst other (mostly developed) nations say that the issue is “out of scope” because it’s not explicitly mentioned in the agreed workplan.

So BCAs are on the “agenda” in the sense that everyone is talking about them but they’re not yet on the formal agenda. We’ll see what happens in the follow-up meetings on June 8th and 9th.

I’m actually quite cheered by this particular disagreement. The reason it wasn’t explicitly on the agenda is simply because it wasn’t a major issue for anyone in 2019. It’s now a big issue for everyone. That’s good! I’m also cheered that those asking for BCAs to be discussed now, are not saying they’re against them. They simply want to understand the impacts. I hope that’s so that solutions to any down-sides can be found.

This is also something for us to think about in CCL. Would the BCAs that we support have an undesirable impact on low-income countries?

Dave Waltham

Image: OxfordClimatePolicy.org

Why is climate negotiation so difficult? This thought passed through my head repeatedly, today, as I contemplated the efforts of 250 diplomats to agree common time frames for NDCs. Let me explain what (I think) that means and then I’ll come back to my puzzlement over how hard it is.

The UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is that we will reduce our economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by at least 68% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2030. This is a 10-year plan, i.e. it covers the years 2021-2030 inclusive. But many nations argue that we need 5 year plans. It’s also worth mentioning that every plan I’ve seen has a different baseline year (Russia’s compares to 2010, Argentina’s to 2007 and so on) and there’s also no technical reason why 10-year plans can’t run, say, from 2026-2035. NDCs could, in principle, all have different starting dates, different durations and different baselines but it obviously makes more sense for everyone to do things the same way. Then we can compare like with like and can monitor every country’s progress in the same way.

No-one disagrees with this. Not one delegation at today’s meeting said anything other than that common time frames are a good idea and that we should agree them prior to COP26 in November. I can’t even believe it matters very much to anyone politically. The Chinese government won’t fall if it agrees to 7 year plans and Boris Johnson won’t be thrown out of office for deciding that UK emissions should be compared every 13 years to what they were in the tax-year 2003-04. Even more surprisingly, every NDC I’ve actually looked at is, in fact, a 10 year plan.

So what’s the problem? Why have thousands of diplomat-years been spent, since the Paris agreement 6 years ago, trying unsuccessfully to agree a common way to do NDCs? I’m obviously missing something. Perhaps it’s just as well I’m not a diplomat!

Dave Waltham

The learning curve for COP26-processes is as steep and technically tricky as the North Ridge of Everest. I’m currently getting my head around the draft provisional agenda item 4b of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation whilst looking forward with barely suppressed excitement for the 4^th meeting of the Katowice Committee of Experts—I wonder what they’re experts in?

The May-June 2021 UNFCCC sessions of the subsidiary bodies has just got under way, on-line, and these are a key part of the preparation for COP26 in November. As with the main COP meeting itself, sessions are attended by invited observers and I put myself forward when CCE (Citizens’ Climate Education who have permanent UNFCCC observer status) asked for volunteers.

Observers ensure openness, fairness and transparency. I’m delighted and proud to be involved but, here I am, several hours into my first session and the main thing I’ve learned is that “no issue should be left behind”.  I think this means we’re going to grow a lawn one blade at a time and I’m not looking forward to keeping my eyes open through the 11pm-2am sessions next week and the 4am starts the week after (the timing changes from week to week to ensure no time-zones are penalised).

Despite the pledges to follow up all issues, it’s quite clear that many of the delegations believe that important matters are being left behind. In particular, global-south is upset that global-north has not got anywhere near their pledge of $100 billion per year of green finance by 2020. They’re also worried about the possibility of tariffs punishing the trade of nations with little responsibility for global warming.

The impression I have, so far, is of an agenda that’s more acceptable to developed nations than to developing ones. Another example is the gap on “transparency”, i.e. the mechanisms whereby nations will report on their progress in reducing emissions. I may be wrong—there’s so much “reading between the lines” needed at these meetings—but I think this is a negotiating tactic, i.e. “we’ll play ball on transparency once historical responsibility is properly acknowledged and compensated for”.

This all leaves me a little deflated and exhausted; the negotiators’ task is even steeper and more technically difficult than my learning curve but, hopefully, my reports will get more optimistic as we go through the next three weeks.

Dave Waltham